Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2 Emission in Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory by Xu, Xiaozhou et al.
Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2 Emission in
Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory
Xiaozhou Xu, Shenle Pan, Eric Ballot
To cite this version:
Xiaozhou Xu, Shenle Pan, Eric Ballot. Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2 Emission in
Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory. INCOM 2012, May 2012, Bucharest,
Romania. <hal-00733491>
HAL Id: hal-00733491
https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00733491
Submitted on 18 Sep 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2
Emission in Pooled Supply Chains Using
Cooperative Game Theory
Xiaozhou. Xu ∗ Shenle. Pan ∗∗ Eric. Ballot ∗∗∗
∗Mines ParisTech, CGS and CAOR, 75272, Paris, France, (e-mail:
xiaozhou.xu@mines-paristech.fr)
∗∗Mines ParisTech, CGS, 75272, Paris, France, (e-mail:
shenle.pan@mines-paristech.fr)
∗∗∗Mines ParisTech, CGS, 75272, Paris, France, (e-mail:
eric.ballot@mines-paristech.fr)
Abstract: The sustainability of supply chain,both economical and ecological, has attracted
intensive attentions of academic and industry. It is proven in former works that supply chain
pooling given by horizontal cooperation among several independent supply chains create a new
common supply chain network that could reduce the costs and the transport CO2 emissions.
In this regard, this paper introduces a scheme to share in a fairly manner the savings. After
a summary of the concept of pooled-supply-networks optimization and CO2 emission model,
we use cooperative game theory as the cooperative mechanism for the implementation of the
horizontal pooling. Since we proved the related pooling game to be super-additive, a fair and
stable allocation of common gain in transportation cost and CO2 emission is calculated by
Shapley Value concept. Through a case study, the results show that supply chains pooling can
result in reductions of both transportation cost and carbon emissions, and that the increase of
carbon-tax rate gives enterprises more incentives for the implementation of such pooling scheme.
Keywords: Supply chains pooling, Sustainable supply chain, Transportation, CO2 emission,
Cooperative game theory, Shapley Value
1. INTRODUCTION
The supply chain sustainability, both economical and eco-
logical, has been considered as important criteria of supply
chain evaluation, and it is these two aspects of sustainabil-
ity that we studied in this work. Among different aspects
of a whole supply chain, transportation is an important
activity to be investigated for promoting the supply chain
sustainability due to greater transportation distances and
bigger portion of both cost and CO2 emission represented
by this activity.
About the appropriate means for cost and emission re-
duction, the supply chains pooling, an innovative form of
organization that will be detailed later, is such an approach
that defines a common logistics system involving shippers
of different supply chains to increase the supply chain
efficiency. It is developed on the basis of supply networks
merging concept. In previous research, the significant im-
provement of economical and/or ecological performance
achieved by this type of organization has been showed.
See Cruijssen et al. (2007) and Ballot and Fontane (2010).
Since the supply chains pooling can achieve the economi-
cal and ecological efficiency improvement, naturally there
arise the incentives for such cooperation. Before all op-
erators being convinced to form a coalition, and thus to
organize their transportation, even design their logistics
network cooperatively in this common system for reducing
CO2 emission, the payoff-allocation criterion must be well
defined antecedently. This problem is covered by the co-
operative game theory, a branch of the Game Theory that
has been founded by the famous work of Von Neumann
et al. (2007). In this paper, we will show that this theory
can bring us an instructive decision framework for the
implementation of the logistics pooling.
The contribution of this article is as follows. At first, we
describe a supply chains pooling scheme for cooperating
among supply networks. Secondly, we develop an optimiza-
tion model for the pooled supply networks to reduce the
total cost, which consist of transportation cost and carbon
tax. Then, through a case study, we assess the sensitivity
of pooling optimization to the tax rate, and found that the
carbon tax gives incentive for pooling. Thirdly, we define
the cooperative pooling game to investigate the cooperat-
ing mechanism lies in the implementation of this pooling
scheme, and prove the super-additivity of such game. At
last, we propose a reasonable and stable imputation by
adopting the Shapley Value concept to allocate the savings
in the corresponding pooling game.
The article is organized as follows. In Part 2, we will
present the pooling concept and the supply chains pooling
developed on this basis. In Part 3, the preliminary of
cooperative game theory and some important concepts
therein will be introduced. In Part 4, we will introduce
the supply-chains-pooling optimization problem studied
and the setting of corresponding game. Then we will
investigate a real-world case of a retail supply chains
network we have optimized and studied in Part 5. At last,
we will summarize the insights achieved by this article in
Part 6.
2. SUPPLY CHAINS POOLING: AN INNOVATIVE
FORM OF COLLABORATION TOWARDS
SUSTAINABILITY
2.1 Pooling approaches to sustainability
Today, enterprises cannot ignore the environmental issue
in their business activities. The increasing government reg-
ulation and stronger public mandates of the environmental
accountability take this issue onto the enterprises’ agenda.
Vanek and Morlok (2000) showed that the transportation,
which is intensively used in supply chain, is one of the
biggest contributors of the carbon emission. In France,
road vehicles represent 30% of all CO2 emissions, with 15%
by trucks (domestic freight trains, ships and planes ac-
count for between 1% and 2% of emissions) as to CITEPA
(2009). A survey by Le´onardi and Baumgartner (2004) es-
tablished a very strong correlation between transportation
efficiency and CO2 emissions. Therefore, improving freight
transportation efficiency will help reduce one of the major
sources of CO2 emissions.
Grouping freights together to consolidate them is a rel-
atively old idea for improving transportation efficiency.
Thus Hall (1987) and Pooley and Stenger (1992) defined
several forms of consolidation: warehouses consolidation,
cross-docking consolidation platforms and consolidation at
the level of means of transportation. These forms of consol-
idation are essentially evidenced at the level of transport
operations.
However, at the level of supply or distribution networks,
they are designed by each company (manufacturer or re-
tailer) separately. As a result, transportation resources are
significantly underused and the overall volume is growing,
thus entering into contradiction with environment objec-
tives, as illustrated in the work of McKinnon and Piecyk
(2009).To improve the efficiency of goods transportation,
it has been realized that collaboration between these in-
dependent supply chains could be a possible solution.
Horizontal cooperation was applied to large-scale logistics
for the first time in Cruijssen and Salomon (2004) who
used a case study of flower transportation in the Nether-
land as a basis. They found that sharing transportation
orders at IT level between carriers generated transporta-
tion cost savings generally varying between 5 and 15%. In
a similar manner, Ergun et al. (2007) covered collaboration
between shippers and showed that it enabled the hidden
costs linked to transportation by service companies to be
reduced, reducing trips when running empty in order to
reposition lorries. To confirm the potential advantage of
horizontal cooperation at logistics level, Cruijssen et al.
(2007) conducted a survey of close to 162 Flemish com-
panies, 75% of which mentioned that this cooperation
strategy could increase company productivity.
According to the results shown above, collaboration, spe-
cially horizontal cooperation, is therefore a solution to
improve logistics, transportation efficiency in particular,
both economically and ecologically. It is in this context
that pooling is proposed and studied. There exist very few
articles on the impact of collaboration on logistics pooling,
and the related environmental impact. However, since the
cooperative logistics pooling is proved to be an effective
approach to the improvement of transportation efficiency,
specially fuel efficiency and fill rate, as demonstrated
above, we can naturally deduce that it is an approach,
which, by its efficiency, can encounter also sustainable
development issues, as showed in the work of Pan et al.
(2010).
2.2 Supply networks pooling
An example of supply networks pooling is displayed in
Fig. 1. Firstly, classic supply chain networks for retail dis-
tribution, in which each actor has his dedicated network,
is illustrated in the top part of Fig. 1. In relation to this
system, pooling is carried out if, and only if, it improves
operation of the supply chain, for example better fill rate
for the lorries ordered in Full Truck Load (FTL) in the
network, if we take into account the impact of pooling
on transportation only. It was shown by McKinnon et al.
(2003) that the fill rate was low (60%) for downstream
flows in particular. Therefore, it is advantageous to study
pooled systems. The pooled system described in the lower
part of Fig. 1 shows, on the other hand, the grouping of
flows. The advantage of this type of system was shown in
Pan et al. (2010).
Fig. 1. Illustration of the logistics pooling (Ai: Supplier
i; Rj: Retailer j; WH: Warehouse; DC: Distribution
Center; POS: Point Of Sale)
The cost optimization of the logistics network was studied
as a transportation problem, formulated by a mixed linear
integer optimization problem studied in Pan (2010), It
involves optimizing the allocation of flows to minimize the
transportation cost and other possible additional costs:
transfer, opening of a logistics center, stocks, etc. The
optimized flows form the optimized network—we can then
see according to the assignment of the flows carried out,
whether or not the pooling of flows is advantageous. By
the same procedure, Pan also developed the optimization
model for the CO2-emission issue in that work. For more
details of implementation, readers who are interested can
refer to Pan (2010).
Pan et al. (2010) optimized separately the total trans-
portation cost and the CO2 emission in a pooled supply
chains network, using the real data from the industrial
practice. As the results shows, this kind of innovative
organization is preferable for promoting the supply chains
sustainability.
2.3 Objective of pooling
In this work, we concern both the economical and en-
vironmental sides of the total cost. Due to the actual
implementation of carbon tax in European countries, and
the international trend on emission control, the reduction
of CO2 emission, which will affect both client preference
and the level of tax, will become indispensable task for
enhancing competitive ability.
So we enhance the cost-optimization model by taking CO2
tax into consideration. We set the objective function of the
optimization model as MIN : C + r · e, where C denotes
the total cost of pooled network incurred by transport
activities, r denotes the rate of carbon tax while e denotes
the total content of CO2 emitted by transport. For further
details about the optimization model, readers who are
interested can refer to Pan (2010). This model optimizes
the sum of global transportation cost and global emission
tax arising in the pooled network.
2.4 Viability of supply chains pooling
The pooled transportation systems shown here have an
economic advantage but they also enable the environment
footprint to be reduced. However, for a reduction of this
kind to be implemented, participation in pooled systems
must not only be globally economically advantageous but
it must be fair for each participant. Moreover, the survey
in Cruijssen et al. (2007) mentioned before showed that
the main obstacle to the implementation of collaboration
resides in the difficulty of constructing mechanisms for
fair distribution of the gains between the members of the
coalition. The difficulty in finding long-term partners for a
win/win relationship is also mentioned by firms answering
the survey. These difficulties can also be noted with the
implementation of pooling principles. To do this, we will
apply cooperative game theory with transferable utility.
3. TRANSFERABLE UTILITY COOPERATIVE
GAME THEORY
3.1 Introduction to TU cooperative game theory
As to Hart et al. (1997), the game theory is divided
into two main approaches: the non-cooperative and the
cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory is used
in cases where the players can achieve more benefit by
cooperating with other players than staying alone, thus
it can be aptly applied to investigate the supply chains
pooling game.Assuming that the common gain created by
pooling can be shared between the players, in this instance
pooling is therefore a TU-Cooperative game. In a TU-
cooperative game, the players are allowed to make binding
commitment, which defines how to cooperate as a coalition
and how should common profit be shared out.
TU-cooperative game theory properties and notation A
TU-cooperative game can be denoted by G = (N, v),
where N , called the grand coalition, represents the finite
set of players and v is the characteristic function that can
be interpreted as the worth of coalitions. We can define
a coalition S, which is a subset of N . For each S ⊆ N ,
v(S) gives the maximum value created by the coalition.
As defined by Shapley (1971),the game G = (N, v) is said
to be super-additive if the characteristic function satisfies
inequation (1).
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) ∀S, T ⊆ N and S ∩ T = Ø. (1)
It signifies that the two separate coalitions can create
at least as much value if they form one large coalition.
An allocation x is a vector with n elements xi that
indicate the corresponding payoff of each player. A payoff
vector satisfies efficiency if
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). Further,
an allocation x is called an imputation if x satisfies two
constraints: xi ≥ v(i) ∀i ∈ N and efficiency. The set of all
imputations of a game G = (N, v) is denoted by I(N, v).
3.2 Approaches to cooperative game solutions
Hart et al. (1997) divided cooperative game approaches
into core-like and value-like approaches. Core-like ap-
proaches give a set of allocations that conform to some gen-
eral properties of feasible solution. Value-like approaches
can serve as feasible solution set to choose from, or a
proposition of feasible solution axiomatized.
Core-like approach and the core The Core is a repre-
sentative core-like approach. For a TU-cooperative game
(N, v), the core C(N, v) is defined by equation (2).
C(N, v) =
{
x |
∑
xi∈I(N,v)
xi = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S)
∀S ⊆ N and x ∈ I(N, v)
}
.
(2)
As Kannai (1992) illustrated, It is the set of all feasible
payoff vectors that no player or coalition can improve
upon by acting for themselves. It can be used to verify
the stability of specific allocations. The major drawback
of the core-like solution is that the core could be empty or
non-unique.
Value-like approach and the Shapley Value Due to the
complexity of computing and the non-uniqueness of core-
like solutions, the value-like solutions, especially the Shap-
ley Value, are more intensively addressed for analyzing
collaborations in supply chain management.
Shapley Value is a solution concept evaluating the de-
served payoff of player i according to its marginal con-
tributions to all the subsets of N\{i}. This concept
is originally proposed in Shapley (1953). In a TU-
cooperative game (N, v), the Shapley Value is a payoff
vector φ(v) = (φ1(v), φ2(v), . . . φn(v)) verifying certain
axioms. The Shapley Value must satisfies four axioms:
efficiency, dummy players, symmetry and linearity, which
are axiomatized by Hart et al. (1997).
It has been proven that there is always a unique solution
that satisfies all four axioms, i.e. the Shapley Value φ. For
a game G = (N, v), it can be calculated by the following
formula (3):
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N ;i∈S
(|N | − |S|)! · (|S| − 1)!
|N |! · [v(S)− v(S\{i})],
∀ i ∈ N.
(3)
As shown in the formula above, it is easier to calculate
than Core-like solutions, and the Shapley Value of some
special game have favorable properties. Be´al et al. (2008)
has proved that the Shapley Value is a stable imputation
for a super-additive TU-Cooperative game. That is why
this theory is widely disseminated.
4. PROPERTIES OF TU-GAME APPLIED TO
SUPPLY NETWORKS POOLING
4.1 Definition of the coalitions
For the implementation of pooled network, we should
investigate the related cooperative-game-theory issues to
set up the cooperation mechanism. The first question:
who are players and what are the possible definitions of
coalitions.
Since the supply chains pooling is the collaboration among
suppliers and retailers, so there are possibilities that either
suppliers or retailers take charge of the transportation.
Thus there are two approaches: either one of the two
groups, group of suppliers or that of retailers, takes charge
of the transportation and the group in charge will share
the common gain as players of the pooling game; or all
suppliers and retailers participate altogether the pooling
game, and take each one a share of the common gain. It is
the second approach that has been adopted in this work.
The first approach is unworkable since we can easily
imagine, if suppliers were to pool their logistics for serving
retailers, it would not be long before the latter claimed
part of the gains obtained on deliveries and, vice versa,
by changing the roles. This would inevitably give rise
to secondary sharing out of the gain by negotiation.
Therefore, the definition of the pooled logistics systems
studied here can be defined by the game Gtm = (N, v)
with N = A ∪R where A is the set of all suppliers and R
is the set of all retailers.
In particular, for a transport problem, we first define that
at least one supplier and one retailer are required in a valid
coalition.The set of invalid coalitions are written here as
CI , let cI = Ø, cI ⊆ Aor cI ⊆ R be the members of CI .
And the characteristic function of them will equal 0.
4.2 Properties of the characteristic function in pooled
supply networks
In cooperative game theory, the characteristic function
v(S) is the value created by the coalition S, and this value
will be shared by the member players (denoted by i,∀i ∈
S) of this coalition. Given that this work concentrate on
logistics pooling, and that the corresponding optimization
problem aims at minimization of the sum of transportation
cost and carbon tax, the value created by pooling should
be the reduction of the total cost. So the characteristic
function is defined by v(S) = I(S)−M(S),∀S ⊆ N , where
the I(S) and M(S) are the total cost before and after the
pooling. All pooling optimizations are computed by the
model indicated in Part 2.3.
To determine v(S), it is important to make some clarifica-
tion about the properties of pooling:
Property 1. Non-pooling in a simple coalition: I(p) = M(p)
if p is a coalition of one supplier and one retailer. P denotes
the collection of all such simple coalitions p.
Property 2. Linearity of costs without pooling: I(S) =∑
p∈P,p⊆S I(p);
Property 3. Superiority: pooling does not increase the
transportation cost, then I(S)−M(S) ≥ 0;
Property 4. Economy of scale in pooling: M(S ∪ S′) ≤
M(S) +M(S′), S, S′ ⊆ N ; by this property, it is easy to
further prove that the pooling game is a super additive
game because v(S) + v(S′) ≤ v(S ∪ S′).
Consequently, the game corresponding to the pooling of
logistics systems Gtm = (N, v) studied in this work can be
defined as a set of equations (4):
Gtm = (N, v) : v(cI) = 0, cI = Ø, cI ⊆ Aor cI ⊆ R;
v(p) = 0, p = {Ai ∈ A,Rj ∈ R} and |p| = 2;
v(S) ≥ 0, S ⊆ N andS 6∈ (CI ∪ P );
(4)
The game Gtm = (N, v) is proven to be super-additive as
stated in Property 4. The super-additivity means that, by
cooperating in the grand coalition, players in the pooling
game can achieve the highest cost reduction. Furthermore,
this type of game has interesting solution properties. Be´al
et al. (2008) has proved that the Shapley Value is a stable
imputation for a super-additive TU-Cooperative game.
Thus the properties of supply networks pooling game
are introduced in subsequent sections. In Part 5, we will
investigate a real-world case modeled as pooling game.
5. A REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY: THE RETAIL
LOGISTICS NETWORK IN FRANCE
The case study in this work is conducted with real flows
data provided by Club De´me´ter (the association of major
logistics players in France, www.club-demeter.fr). This
support enables us to conduct studies on the basis of a
real database of French retail supply chains.
5.1 Presentation of the retail logistics pooling game
From the database provided by partners, we chose four
suppliers that have extensive flows of consumer goods from
the same location and deliver to the national distribution
centers of two retailers, who are in fact common customers
of these suppliers. There are thus 4 warehouses (WH)
already collocated in the same area and 32 distribution
centers (DC) considered in our optimization problem as
showed in Fig. 2. The transportation scope studied in this
work is between the WHs and the DCs.
Fig. 2. Location of the logistics sites in the study (Rect-
angle=WH; Triangle=DC)
The flows are determined from weekly records over a 33-
week horizon. Table 1 illustrates the characteristics of the
logistics systems in question.
Table 1. Characteristics of the case study flows
(ALD/C: Average linear distance / connexion;
SDLD: Standard deviation of linear distance;
AF/CW: Average flows / connexion per week;
SDF/W: Standard deviation of flows/ week.)
Sites Connections ALD/C
(km)
SDLD
AF/CW
(pallet)
SDF/W
A (R1; R2)
A1 1 5; 8 548 222 26,51 37,35
A2 1 24; 3 399 249 7,91 10,67
A3 1 21; 8 399 225 68,73 39,74
A4 1 24; 8 425 244 39,44 29,96
R
R1 24 74 391 255 40,04 39,06
R2 8 21 523 150 31,5 35,37
The flows belonging to different supplier-distributor pairs
were classified, so that the pooling schemes of all possible
coalitions can be optimized separately to compute the
gains can be achieved by the coalitions, i.e. the char-
acteristic function values of all possible coalitions. This
pooling game thus modeled consists of |A| = 4 suppliers
and |R| = 2 retailers (N = 6).
5.2 Optimization results
As a first step, we need to determine an appropriate
tax rate for optimization. We assessed the sensitivity of
pooling optimization to the tax rate r by optimizing the
grand coalition N with r ∈ {0, 20, 50, 100, 200} (¤/t CO2)
respectively. The results listed in Table 2 show that the
tax rate does not affect the pooling scheme. When the tax
rate increases, the transportation scheme keeps always the
same. But we can notice that, as the tax rate increases,
there will be more reduction of total cost, thus more
incentives for pooling.
Table 2. Optimization results of the grand
coalition with different tax rates corresponding
to independent supply chain operations
Tax rate (¤/t) 0 20 50 100 200
Reduction of trans-
portation cost (¤)
37213 37213 37213 37213 37213
Reduction of CO2
emission (t)
13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6
Reduction of Car-
bon tax (¤)
0 272 680 1360 2720
Reduction of Total
cost (¤)
37213 37485 37893 38573 39933
This result is reasonable considering the similar piecewise-
linear form of the emission and cost function illustrated in
the work of Pan et al. (2010). Since the pooling scheme
does not change with different tax rates, we choose the
rate 20 ¤/t in our case study. Then by adopting the
optimization model presented in the work of Pan et al.
(2010), we optimized the objective function MIN : C +
r · e of all possible coalitions respectively, and computed
the results of I(S),M(S) and v(S) of valid coalitions
S ⊆ N (the v(S) values are listed in Table 3), where
I(N) = 144286 and M(N) = 106801 represent the highest
total cost reduction. Thus we can see that the cooperative
pooling scheme can achieve 25.98% reduction of the total
cost by players’ cooperation in the grand coalition.
Table 3. Optimization results of all possible
coalitions with r=20 ¤/t
5.3 Gain allocation by Shapley Value
Based on the total cost reductions (characteristic function
values) of the valid coalitions, we computed the Shapley
Values of all players in the game with grand coalition
(listed in Table 4). The Shapley Values are computed by
adopting the approach proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989), called the Potentiality approach, which further
simplifies the calculation.
Based on these previous results, we can conclude as
follows. At first, by cooperating in the grand coalition,
players can get the highest common gain, which ensures
the incentives to form the grand coalition. Secondly, we
verify that the imputation computed by Shapley Value
concept lies in the core, which means that such allocation
Table 4. Gain allocation in the pooling game
with grand coalition with r=20 ¤/t
A1 A2 A3 A4 R1 R2
Allocation of
transportation
cost reduction
(¤)
4374 5530 5128 6965 9440 5775
Allocation of
CO2 tax
reduction (¤)
32 40 38 52 70 42
Shapley Values
of total cost
reduction (¤)
4406 5570 5166 7017 9510 5817
of the common gain is acceptable for all players. Further,
since the computation of this imputation considered all
players marginal contribution, as the computing procedure
of the Shapley Value concept shows, this imputation is
reasonable and fair. At last, we can see that the emission
tax is also a cooperation incentive, though lack of deterrent
effect.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduced firstly an innovative form
of logistics cooperation, the supply chains pooling, which
minimizes the sum of transportation cost and carbon tax.
Then, we proposed a cooperative-game-theory approach
as the cooperative mechanism for the implementation of
such pooling scheme.
We confirmed the validity of this pooling scheme in re-
ducing both the transportation cost and the carbon tax
by showing that, a cost-reduction rate of 25.98% has been
achieved in the case study of the retail logistics network in
France. Also, after the supply-chains-pooling game being
proved a super-additive game, the imputation computed
by the Shapley Value concept has been proved to be fair
and stable as to the marginal-contribution consideration
and the collective rationality of all players. Such gain-
sharing scheme can effectively promote the formation of
the logistics-cooperation alliances, thus improve the logis-
tics productivity.
There are some drawbacks of this paper, which can be
overcome by our ongoing research works. The first is the
absence of cooperation cost in the game design. The second
is about the modeling of different bargaining power of
players. Then we will investigate the application of our
pooling scheme in big game with many players.
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